manajerial economic and business strategy

manajerial economic and business strategy

Managerial Economics & Business Strategy Chapter 6 The Organization of the Firm Michael R. Baye, Managerial Economics and Business Strategy, 5e. Hakan TASCI McGraw-Hill/lrwin Elon University rights reserved. Departmentby 2006 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, All rights reserved. Copyright OCopyright The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. lnc. All Spring 2007 2006 of Economics Overview l. Methods of Procuring Inputs Spot Exchange Contracts Vertical Integration II. Transaction Costs Specialized Investments Ill. Optimal Procurement Input ‘V. Principal-Agent Problem Owners-Managers Managers-workers

Elon University Copyright Economics Department Ofc 2006 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All Spring 2007 Manager’s Role ??? Procure inputs in the least cost manner, like point B. ??? Provide incentives for workers to put forth effort. ??? Failure to accomplish this results in a point like A. ??? Achieving points like B managers must Use all inputs efficiently. costly method. Costs $100 10 Methods of Procuring Inputs ??? Spot Exchange When the buyer and seller of an input meet, exchange, and then go their separate ways. No official contracts, no long term relation ??? Contracts

A legal document that creates an extended relationship between a buyer and a seller. Ex: Car Rental Companies and Auto maintenance ??? Vertical Integration When a firm shuns other suppliers and chooses to produce an input internally. Set up your own service in the rental company. No specialization. Specialization, avoids contracting costs, avoids costs of vertical integration. Possible “hold-up problem. ” ??? Contracting Specialization, reduces opportunism, avoids skimping on specialized investments. Costly in complex environments. Reduces opportunism, avoids contracting costs.

Lost specialization and may increase organizational costs. Transaction Costs ??? Costs of acquiring an input over and above the amount paid to the input supplier. ??? Includes: Search costs. Negotiation costs. Other required investments or expenditures. ??? Some transactions are general in nature while others are specific to a trading relationship. ??? Investments made to allow two parties to exchange but has little or no value outside of the exchange Site specificity. Physical-asset specificity. Dedicated assets. Human capital. ??? Lead to higher transaction costs Costly bargaining. Underinvestment.

Opportunism and the hold-up problem. and Contract Length MC MBI Due to greater need for specialized investments MBO Longer Contract Contract Length Optimal Input Procurement Substantial specialized investments relative to contracting costs? Yes No Complex contracting environment relative to costs of integration? Vertical Integration The Principal-Agent Problem ??? Occurs when the principal cannot observe the effort of the agent. Example: Shareholders (principal) cannot observe the effort of the manager (agent). Example: Manager (principal) cannot observe the effort of workers (agents). ? The Problem: Principal cannot determine whether a bad outcome was the result of the agent’s low effort or due to bad luck. ??? Manager’s must recognize the existence of the principal-agent problem and devise plans to align the interests of workers with that of the firm. ??? Shareholders must create plans to align the interest of the manager with those of the shareholders. Solving the Problem Between Owners and Managers ??? Internal incentives Incentive contracts. Stock options, year-end bonuses. ??? External incentives Personal reputation. Potential for takeover. Managers and Workers Profit sharing Revenue sharing

Piece rates Time clocks and spot checks Conclusion ??? The optimal method for acquiring inputs depends on the nature of the transactions costs and specialized nature of the inputs being procured. ??? To overcome the principal-agent problem, principals must devise plans to align the Michael R. Baye, Managerial Economics and Business Strategy, 5e. Copyright 2006 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. Additional Review ??? Bayes Text, pages 229-233 Question #23, 6, 8, 10, 11, 14, 16, 18 ??? Chapter 3 Demonstration Problems 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 ??? Concept Review Spot, Trade Off, Specialization, Reputation